G.R. No. 141910
August 6, 2002
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June 18, 1994, 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard its Isuzu truck driven by Lambert Eroles, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While traversing the North Diversion Road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes (P204,450.00) to Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being subrogee of CII’s rights & interests, FGU, in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was only the exclusive hauler of CII since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently dismissed the complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier defined under the law & existing jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, FGU interposed an appeal to the CA. The CA rejected the FGU’s appeal & ruled in favor of GPS. It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
1. WON GPS may be considered a common carrier as defined under the law & existing jurisprudence.
2. WON GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be presumed to have been negligent when the goods it undertook to transport safely were subsequently damaged while in its protective custody & possession.
3. Whether the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case.
1. The SC finds the conclusion of the RTC and the CA to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor & hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering/offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers/goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term “common carrier.”
2. GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract & the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost/suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his:
1. Expectation interest – interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed;
2. Reliance interest – interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made;
3. Restitution interest – interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, or to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.
A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care & corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner without concrete proof of his negligence/fault. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioner’s principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality/juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which would require the claimant for damages to prove the defendant’s negligence/fault.
3. Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latter’s management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management/control use proper care. In the absence of the defendant’s explanation, it affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a rule of substantive law and does not create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant.
However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when:
(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence (includes the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons); and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.
Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless,for the doctrine to apply, the requirement that responsible causes (other than those due to defendant’s conduct) must first be eliminated should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.
On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is predicated on culpa acquiliana, can be said to have been in control & management of the vehicle, it is not equally shown that the accident has been exclusively due to his negligence. If it were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to properly work against him. However, clearly this is not the case.